

# SENATE RECORD VOTE ANALYSIS

105th Congress  
2nd Session

Vote No. 106

April 28, 1998, 2:54 pm  
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## NATO EXPANSION/Bilateral Aid Limits

**SUBJECT:** Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic . . . Treaty Document 105-36. Harkin amendment No. 2312.

### ACTION: AMENDMENT REJECTED, 24-76

**SYNOPSIS:** Treaty Document 105-36, the Protocols to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, will give the Senate's advice and consent to admitting those countries as full members to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

**The Harkin amendment** would add that the United States would limit the military assistance it gave to the new NATO members that would help them meet their NATO obligations to 25 percent of the amount given by the other NATO members. That limit would include aid given by transferring excess defense articles and by aid given through the Foreign Military Financing Program. (Approving the Harkin amendment would create the equivalent of a statutory authorization cap on military aid to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. A ratified treaty is a part of the supreme law of the United States, just like any duly enacted law. Any treaty requirement, just as any enacted requirement, can be superseded by enactment of another law.)

**Those favoring** the amendment contended:

We oppose expanding NATO for a number of reasons, one of which is that we fear it will result in huge costs for the American taxpayers. Current estimates of those costs range astronomically. In February, 1997, the Clinton Administration said that it would cost between \$27 billion and \$35 billion and that the United States' share of that cost would be \$1.5 billion to \$2 billion. NATO then looked at the issue and said that it would only cost \$1.5 billion over 10 years, of which the United States would pay about \$400 million. The Clinton Administration then adopted NATO's numbers, which cover its common budget. In addition to these estimates, we have an estimate from the Rand Corporation that says the costs will be between \$10 billion and \$110 billion, and an estimate

(See other side)

YEAS (24)		NAYS (76)		NOT VOTING (0)	
Republicans (7 or 13%)	Democrats (17 or 38%)	Republicans (48 or 87%)	Democrats (28 or 62%)	Republicans (0)	Democrats (0)
Ashcroft	Baucus	Abraham	Hatch	Akaka	
Bond	Bumpers	Allard	Helms	Biden	
Hutchinson	Byrd	Bennett	Hutchison	Bingaman	
Jeffords	Conrad	Brownback	Inhofe	Boxer	
Kempthorne	Dorgan	Burns	Kyl	Breaux	
Smith, Bob	Feingold	Campbell	Lott	Bryan	
Warner	Graham	Chafee	Lugar	Cleland	
	Harkin	Coats	Mack	Daschle	
	Johnson	Cochran	McCain	Dodd	
	Kohl	Collins	McConnell	Durbin	
	Leahy	Coverdell	Murkowski	Feinstein	
	Moseley-Braun	Craig	Nickles	Ford	
	Moynihan	D'Amato	Roberts	Glenn	
	Murray	DeWine	Roth	Hollings	
	Torricelli	Domenici	Santorum	Inouye	
	Wellstone	Enzi	Sessions	Kennedy	
	Wyden	Faircloth	Shelby	Kerrey	
		Frist	Smith, Gordon	Kerry	
		Gorton	Snowe	Landrieu	
		Gramm	Specter	Lautenberg	
		Grams	Stevens	Levin	
		Grassley	Thomas	Lieberman	
		Gregg	Thompson	Mikulski	
		Hagel	Thurmond	Reed	
				Reid	
				Robb	
				Rockefeller	
				Sarbanes	

#### EXPLANATION OF ABSENCE:

- 1—Official Business
- 2—Necessarily Absent
- 3—Illness
- 4—Other

#### SYMBOLS:

- AY—Announced Yea
- AN—Announced Nay
- PY—Paired Yea
- PN—Paired Nay

from the Congressional Budget Office that says that they could go as high as \$125 billion. The General Accounting Office has issued a report stating that one of the reasons the estimates have varied so widely is that NATO has not yet decided how much of the costs it will be willing to pay for in its common budgets. It will decide this coming June. The United States pays 25 percent of the common budgets. However, more worrisome than that potential cost increase is the amount that the United States may end up paying in bilateral assistance, to which the 25 percent limit will not apply. If the United States, for instance, decides to give billions of dollars worth of military equipment to these countries to help them meet their NATO responsibilities, that aid will not count toward the limit. Similarly, if it decides to use the Foreign Military Financing Program to sell tanks, planes, or similar military items to these new countries, the subsidies from that program will not be counted. Our fear is that the United States may end up paying almost the entire cost. The Harkin amendment would prevent that end by capping all United States military aid to these countries. It would give no more than 25 percent of the NATO total aid, whether through the common budget or otherwise. This is a prudent amendment, in light of the uncertainty over the costs that may be incurred from approving this treaty. Congress should not give a blank check to pay the costs of expanding NATO. We urge Senators to support this amendment.

**Those opposing the amendment contended:**

Our colleagues have greatly exaggerated the degree of uncertainty over the costs of expanding NATO. They have given a high estimate cost from CBO without explaining the basis for that high estimate. CBO initially gave a cost of \$125 billion over 10 years for a worst-case scenario in which the United States would preposition most of its forces in those countries in order to deter a large-scale threatened invasion. That scenario, of course, is impossible; no military opposition of that scale exists or could potentially exist for many years. Further, even if it were possible, we note that the United States could well incur similar costs defending the existing NATO countries. The responsible number to quote from CBO is its most recent estimate that NATO expansion will result in costs in the tens of millions of dollars for the next several years, and will eventually result in an annual increased cost of \$100 million per year. In that estimate, the CBO accepts the NATO estimate of a \$1.5 billion common budget increase over the next 10 years, and it adds its estimate of how much the United States will likely give the three new NATO members in bilateral assistance. Thus, realistically, the estimates are very close. Further, we note that all of the military experts from all of the NATO countries agree that these low cost estimates are accurate or even too high. For instance, we know that German military officials have said that these three countries have demonstrated such a commitment to modernizing their forces that they expect that in a few years they will not only be fully integrated, they will have more advanced, capable militaries than many current NATO members.

Our colleagues apparently believe that even the minimal costs involved are too great. They say it would not be "fair" for the United States to give bilateral aid to these new NATO members that exceeded 25 percent of the amount that other NATO members gave in bilateral aid. Several points need to be made in response to that argument. First, it would relegate those countries to second-class membership. The United States does not put such a restriction on any other member, and, in fact, has regularly given most or all of its NATO allies bilateral aid. For instance, every year for the past 20 years it has given both Turkey and Greece substantial military assistance, and it regularly gives its NATO allies, and other allies for that matter, excess military defense articles. Second, it is inaccurate to include bilateral assistance as part of NATO assistance. We have been helping these countries already, and, if we were to deny them membership, we think we would be morally obligated to provide much more in bilateral assistance than otherwise because they would be on their own due to our refusal to let them join. Third, it would be harmful to United States security if this arbitrary cap prevented it from giving assistance in an emergency situation. Fourth, it would be harmful to the United States defense industrial base because it would include foreign military financing under its definition of bilateral assistance. That financing is provided for the benefit of United States exporters, not the purchasers, and is necessary because of world practices in military sales. Suppose, for example, Poland decided to purchase warplanes. The United States might want to encourage it to buy F-15s by offering foreign military financing credit. However, unless other NATO members agreed to pick up 75 percent of the cost of subsidizing this purchase in order to benefit United States manufacturers, the Harkin amendment would forbid giving that credit. Do our colleagues suggest that France, which gives very generous subsidies to countries to purchase its Mirage fighters, might be interested in paying that 75 percent? The Harkin amendment, for all practical purposes, might just as well state that these three new NATO allies would be denied all foreign military financing assistance.

The Harkin amendment, based on a very faulty analysis of the costs of expanding NATO, would impose very punitive military assistance caps on Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Those caps would treat those countries as second-class members, would harm United States national security, and would harm United States defense companies. This amendment should be resoundingly defeated.